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EXTRATERRITORIAL OPERATION AND EFFECT
OF CONFISCATORY DECREES OF THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT
JOHN PAUL TROTTER
MEMBER OF THE CHARLOTTE BAR, NORTH CAROLINA
In two recent cases' the Court of Appeals of New York con-
sidered the question as to what operation or effect is to be given by
American courts to decrees of the Russian Soviet government ("Rus-
sian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic"), where the decrees intend
the confiscation of private property-confiscations on a large scale
having been actually made under several such decrees within the
territory over which the Soviet regime has held sway by virtue of
paramount force for nearly eight years-the government of the
United States having steadfastly refused to accord recognition to
the Soviet government as either the de facto or de lure government
of that country.2 Aside from the interest which the question
arouses in the mind of those interested in the point of international
law involved, the effect which the American courts give such decrees
is of tremendous interest to American bankers,3 insurance com-
panies, 4 manufacturers and investors therein,G and others, as well as
the agents or agencies in this country of not a few Russian corpora-
tions which are, or were, engaged in business in this country.
Pursuant to its avowed purpose of "relieving the workingman
from the oppression of capital," the Soviet government, shortly after
having made its coup d'6tat in November, 1917, promulgated a num-
ber of radical and far-reaching decrees, the ostensible purpose of
which was to make state monopolies of a number of the more im-
portant industries, among which may be mentioned the shipping
'Sokoloff v. National City Bank (1924) 239 N. Y. 158, 37 A. L. R. -, 145
N. E. 917, and Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (1925) 239 N.
Y. 248, 37 A. L. R.-, 146 N. E. 369. See also the several recent cases decided
by inferior courts of that state cited infra.
'An interesting discussion of the refusal of our government to recognize
the soviet regime will be found in the opinion of Mr. Justice Andrews in
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario (1923) 235 N. Y. 255,
139 N. E. 259.
'See, for example, the situations presented in Gurdus v. Philadelphia Nat.
Bank (1922) 273 Pa. 110, 23 A. L. R. 1227, 116 Atl. 672, and Sokoloff v.
National City Bank, supra, note 1.
'See, Hennenlotter v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. (1924) 124 Misc. 626,
207 N. Y. Supp. 588.
'See, Bourne v. Bourne (1924) 209 App. Div. 419, 204 N. Y. Supp. 866
'See, Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Iny. Co., supra, note 1.
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business, insurance, banking, woodworking, etc. As heretofore sug-
gested, the wording of the decrees states their object to be to effect
fundamental economic reforms, but it is not improbable that the fiats
were actually issued to give legal color to contemplated seizures of
private property needed to produce funds to maintain the govern-
ment established after the overthrow of the shot lived Provisional
government of Kerensky; this is an omnipresent act of governments
established through revolutions, as may be seen by a perusal of cases
cited in the note, arising out of confiscations not only by the "comic
opera" governments of Central and South America, but even nearer
home.7 At least, the Soviet government expeditiously effected its
economic "reforms" by issuing decrees, under the hand of Lenin,
ordering the seizure of the properties of the industries affected,
declaring them to be the property of the state, dissolving the corpo-
rations or companies operating them, and declaring them to be
nationalized 8 or amalgamated into departments of state.9
With the international business interests conducted in Russia and
the large amount of business transacted in this country and else-
where "outside of Russia by Russian insurers, bankers, etc., the effect
of such decrees was instantaneously and stunningly felt. And hardly
had this blow been dealt in the English and American foreign busi-
ness circles than the courts of those countries -were asked to
determine the effect to be given the decrees abroad.10 The duty of
considering, with a view to legality, decrees so flagrantly violative
of Anglo-American economic and legal concepts, is not a pleasant
one for the judges; but it is a duty."-
In giving, or refusing to give, effect to a decree of a foreign
government, a consideration of prime importance is whether the
I IMoore, Int. Law Dig. 56, et seq. As to the sovereign right to confiscate
private property, see 2 Wharton's Int. Law Dig. §248 (pp. 709, et seq.).
' See annotation in 37 American Law Reports as to the extraterritorial effect
of the nationalization of foreign corporations.
'A full translation of several such decrees may be found in the judgments
of their Lordships in the case of Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v.
Comptoir d'Escoinpte de Mulhouse [1925] A. C. 112, 40 Times L. R. 837, 68
S ol. Jo. 841, 93 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1084, 1098-H. L.
10Aksionairnoye Obschestvo v. Sagor [1921] 1 K. B. 456 (judgment reversed
by the Court of Appeal in [1921] 3 K. B. 532, 11 B: R. C. 666, 90 L. J. K. B.
N. S. 1202, 125 L. T. N. S. 705, 37 Times L. R. 777, 65 Sol. Jo. 604) seems to
be the first case in which the question arose; the case is stated elsewhere in
the note.
' "Revolutions and their anarchical legislation do produce results difficult
to fit in with the legislation of orderly States. The judges can only endeavor
to apply settled principles; legislation, or abstention by the Sovereign from
recognition of anarchical States, must do the rest." Scrutton, L.. J., in Banque
Internationale de Commerce v. Goukassow [1923] 2 K. B. 693-C. A.
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government issuing the decree is recognized by the political depart-
ment of the government of the forum, for it is a rule that the courts
must adopt the views of the office of foreign affairs ;12 otherwise,
the courts would, perhaps, commit the diplomatic corps or policy,
and perhaps give rise to a cause of war. For it is a firmly estab-
lished principle of international law as interpreted by the courts of
this country and England that, while the courts can refuse to recog-
nize as valid the laws or decrees of an unrecognized foreign govern-
ment, and may treat them as wholly without extraterritorial effect,la
the laws of a foreign nation which has been accorded recognition by
the foreign office must be recognized as valid and given effect,-at
least, to the extent to which the jurisdiction of the law-enacting
sovereignty extends,-no matter what the courts think of the
morality or justice of the laws. 14 And this is true even though the
'1 Moore, Int. Law Dig. § 75; Oetien v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246
U. S. 297, 62 L. ed. 726, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 309; Aksionairnoye Obschestvo v.
Sagor, supra, note 10.
' The Nueva Anna (1821) 6 Wheat. 193, 5 L. ed. 239; Sokoloff v. National
City Bank, supra, note 1; Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co.,
supra, note 1; Bourne v. Bourne (1924) 209 App. Div. 419, 204 N. Y. Supp.
866; Joint Stock Co. of Volgakama Oil & Chemical Factory v. National City
Bank (1924) 210 App. Div. 665, 206 N. Y. Supp. 476; Russian Reinsurance Co.
v. Stoddard (1925) 211 App. Div. 132, 207 N. Y. Supp. 574; Hennenlotter v.
Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. (1924) 124 Misc. 626, 207 N. Y. Supp. 588;
Aksionairnoye Obschestvo v. Sagor [1921] 1 K. B. 456, judgment reversed by
the Court of Appeal (vide note 10, supra) which, however, approved the hold-
ing on the facts; King of Two Sicilies v. Willco.x (1851) 1 Sim. N. S. 301, 61
Eng. Reprint, 116, 19 L. J. Ch. N. S. 488, 14 Jur. 751. Compare: statement of
Fuller, Ch. J., in Underhill v. Hernandez (1897) 168 U. S. 250, 42 L. ed. 456,
18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; O'Neill v. Central Leather Co. (1915) 87 N. J. L. 552, L.
R. A. 1917 A, 276, 94 Atl. 789. "If a foreign government, or its sovereignty,
is not recognized by the Government of this country the Courts of this country
either cannot, or at least, need not, or ought not, to take notice of, or recognize
such foreign government or its sovereignty." Roche, J., in Aksionairnoye
Obschesivo v. Sagor [1921] 1 K. B. 456 (refusing to accord extraterritorial
effect to a confiscatory decree promulgated by the Soviet Government). See
The Nueva Anna, supra, to the effect that the courts cannot accord recognition
of validity to a confiscatory act of an unrecognized government. Similarly, it
has been said by an inferior court of New York that our government never
having recognized the Soviet government, certain decrees or edicts pronounced
by it, by which the confiscation of much property was intended to be con-
fiscated, had "no force or effect" and were of no importance in the case "except
as interesting facts rending to fix dates." Bourne v. Bourne, supra.
" See among the numerous cases announcing this rule: American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co. (1909) 213 U. S. 347, 53 L. ed. 826, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep.
511, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 299,
62 L. ed. 726, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 309; Monte Blanco Real Estate Corp. v. Wolhin
Line (1920) 147 La. 563, 85 So. 242; Molina v. Comision Reguladora (1918)
92 N. J. L. 38, 104 Atl. 450; Murray v. Vanderbilt (1863) 39 Barb. 140 (fol-
lowing Hamilton v. Accessory Transit Co. (1857) 26 Barb. 46; De La 0 v.
Consolidated Kansas City Smelting & Ref. Co. (1918)-Tex. Civ. App.-, 202
S. W. 1027; Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d Escompte
de Mulhouse, .supra, note 9; Aksionairnoye Obschestvo v. Sagor, supra, note
10; Wright v. Nutt (1788) 1 H. BI. 136, 126 Eng. Reprint, 83; White, Child &
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foreign sovereign confiscates the property of its nationals, or even
citizens of the forum, and affords them no redress,' 5 although the
rule was not applied in two early English cases.16 It makes no dif-
ference ordinarily whether the foreign government has been recog-
nized as the de jure government or only as the de facto government. 17
Furthermore, recognition is retroactive in*this respect, validating the
prerecognition acts of the foreign government.' 8
Bearing these facts and principles in mind, we may turn to a
consideration of the cases of a present interest.19
Beney v. Eagle, S. & B. Dominions Ins. Co. (1922) 127 L. T. N. S. 571, 38
Times L. R. 616-C. A. The Lord Chancellor speaking in Wright v. Nutt,
supra, of the law enacted by the Georgia Legislature shortly after the De-
claration of Independence, attainting the Tory Governor and declaring a con-
fiscation of his property: "It may be a question for private speculation,
whether such a law made in Georgia was a wise or an improvident one, whether
a barbarous or civilized institution. But here we.must take it as the law of
an independent country, and the laws of every country must be equally regarded
by Courts of Justice here, whether in private speculation they are wise or
foolish." To a similar effect is the following statement from the judgment of
Warrington, L. J., in the Sagor Case, supra, considering the effect to be given
by an English court to a decree of the Soviet government, which had been
recognized by England: "It is well settled that the validity of the acts of an
independent sovereign government in relation to property and persons within
its jurisdiction cannot be questioned in the courts of this country: *Every sov-
ereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the (validity of]
acts of another done within its own territory.' Per Clarke, J., delivering the
judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co. [supra]." See also Suits against Foreigners (1794) 1 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 45.
u Cases supra under note 14. See especially the judgment of the Lord
Chancellor in Wright v. Nutt (1788) 1 H. Bl. 136, 126 Eng. Reprint, 83.
See Wolff v. Oxholmn (1817) 6 Maule & S. 92, 105 Eng. Reprint, 1177, 18
Revised Rep. 313; Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. (1888) L. R. 38 Ch. Div. 348, 57 L.
J. Ch. N. S. 536, 58 L. T. N. S. 433, 36 Week. Rep. 492. See also the case of
Ogden v. Folliott (1790) 3 T. R. 726, 100 Eng. Reprint 825, which is, however,
easily distinguished, it being referable to the familiar principles of private inter-
national law that laws do not operate ex proprio vigore extraterritorially and
that "the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another."
' See judgment of Bankes, L. J., of the Court of Appeal, in the Sagor Case,
supra, note 10. See also as to this an article, So-Called "De Facto" Recognition,
31 Yale L. J. 469, where the author, a Barrister of the Inner Temple, concludes
that the distinction between "Recognition Simply and De Facto Recognition"
has no foundation in fact and rests upon a misapprehension.
' Vide, cases supra, note 14. Thus, President Wilson having in 1917 recog-
nized the Carranzaist or Constitutional Government of Mexico as the de jure
government of that country, the courts of this country recognized as valid
governmental acts of that government confiscations of private property made
by Villa and other general officers acting under Carranza prior to 1917. See
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra, note 14.
" For a full discussion of the question under consideration, see annotation in
37 American Law Reports (appended to the case of Fred S. James & Co. v.
Second Russian Ins. Co. (239 N. Y. 248) on the subject, "Extraterritorial effect
of confiscations of property and nationalization of corporations."
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In June, 1917, one Sokoloff paid to the National City Bank of
New York in New York $30,225 upon its promise to open an account
in his favor in its branch in Petrograd, Russia, and to repay him
this sum in rubles at such times and in such amounts as he might
demand. The account was opened, and Sokoloff drew upon it, until
in November, 1917, and February, 1918, checks were presented but
dishonored, although he had a balance remaining of $28,365. There-
after Sokoloff sued the bank in New York, and the defendant made
the defense that in November, 1917, a revolution took place in
Russia, after which the Soviet government was formed; that that
government in the same month decreed the "nationalization" of all
private jointstock banks organized under the laws of Russia or
operating therein, took possession of them by force and decreed that
they be merged in the State Bank of Russia, took possession of their
assets, and assumed their liabilities; that the defendant's assets in
Russia were confiscated, the accounts of depositors being credited
to a revolutionary tax; that the plaintiff, Sokoloff, was aware of the
probability of future political and governmental changes in Russia,
and that it was contemplated by the parties that the agreement should
be performed in Russia and should be governed by the laws of that
country; in short, that Sokoloff's Russian deposit was seized and his
title divested, and the bank's liability discharged. The case, Sokoloff
v. National City Bank,20 finally reached the Court of Appeals of
New York, which affirmed the judgment of the court of the appellate
division for the plaintiff.21 The decision, given in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Cardozo, is based upon the rule, stated above, that Eng-
lish and American courts do not feel themselves bound to accord the
weight of law to the decrees of unrecognized governments, or, as
expressed in the opinion, "acts or decrees, to be ranked as govern-
mental, must proceed from some authority recognized as a govern-
ment de facto." Thus, the Court of Appeals, in refusing to accord
the weight of law to the decrees invoked in defense, regarded them
as wholly without legal effect in this country, and sustained the
bank's liability without regard to the fact that the actual paramount
political force of the place where the obligation was payable had
liquidated the bank's liability. 22
'Supra, note 1.
'Sokoloff v. National City Bank (1924) 208 App. Div. 627, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 69.
In so holding the learned court observed that courts of high repute have
held that confiscation by a government to which recognition has been refused
has no other effect than seizure by bandits or other lawless bodies, and said
that "Juridically, a government that is unrecognized may be viewed as no gov-
ernment at all, if the power withholding recognition chooses thus to view it."
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But the New York court was careful in so holding to observe that
it would be hazardous to say that the rule of decision (vide state-
ment in note 22) is not subject to exception under pressure of some
insistent claim of policy or justice, but should be subject to "self-
imposed limitations of fairness." This suggestion of a limitation to
the rule, while sustained by'no decision 23 and opposed by judicial
utterances made by other courts, 24 is without doubt a sound dictum,
sustained by both reason25 and analogy. 26 In respect of confiscatory
decrees, exceptions may be taken to the rule in favor of the victim
of the spoliation, but the rule may perhaps be applied with full rigor
against the spoliator.2 7 The limitation suggested to the operation of
the rule is pure obiter, however, the facts of the case not calling for
any exception of the rule. The bank was not a bailee of the deposit,
28
and the assets of the bank were not earmarked to Sokoloff's use,
were not a physical object, but a mere chose in action; there was an
executory contract by the bank to respond to the depositor's written
demands for rubles, which the bank refused to perform. Nor was
the defendant corporation's legal liability affected by the attempt of
the Soviet government to terminate its existence-only the sover-
eignty creating a corporation can extinguish its creature, though a
foreign sovereign within whose domain it has extended its activities
can terminate them there; nor was the deposit made upon the security
of the bank's assets in Russia; and, as to the assumption by the
See, however, Gurdus v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank (1922) 273 Pa. 110, 23 A.
L. R. 1227, 116 Atl. 672.
' See The Nueva Anna, supra, note 13, and the quotation of a judge of the
court of Kings Bench, in note 13, supra.
'Effect may at times be due to the ordinances of foreign governments which,
though formally unrecognized, have notoriously an existence as governments in
fact, e. g., the present government of Russia which has actually held the reigns
of government in that country, with or without the consent of the governed,
since November. 1917, and has been accorded de jure recognition by England,
France, Japan, China, and many other countries. It is true, as observed in the
opinion in the Sokoloff Case, that consequences appropriate enough when recog-
nition is withheld on the ground that rival factions are still contending for the
mastery (e. g., the situation in Mexico from 1912 to 1915, or later) may be in
need of readjustment before they can be fitted to the growing practise of with-
holding recognition whenever it is thought that a government, though function-
ing unhampered, is, because of its policies, unworthy of reception into the
society or -"family" of nations.
Vide, Williams v. Bruffy (1878) 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. ed. 716, and 1 Moore,
Int. Law Dig. 56, et seq.
' See Russian Socialist Federated SovietRepublic v. Cibrario (1923) 235
N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259, not a case ihvolving a confiscation, and see also the
holding of the court of Kings Bench in the Sagor Case, supra, note 10.
" Had the defendant been a bailee, surrender of the subject of the bailment
to an overwhelming force would, it seems, have excused the defendant even
though the force confiscating the subject acted wholly beyond the pale of law.
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State Bank of Russia of the dissolved bank's liabilities, there was in
the case no suggestion of a novation whereby the State Bank was
substituted as debtor; and, the bank's assets having already been
confiscated at the time the decree was passed confiscating the accounts
of depositors as a revolutionary tax, the subsequent decree was held
not to operate to the benefit of the bank.2 9 The doctrine of frustra-
tion, invoked by the defendant, was held to have no application to
the case, since the action was for restitution and not damages; and
it was held not to have been shown that the parties intended to have
the obligation depend upon events in Russia.
The rule of decision applicable to confiscatory decrees of the
Soviet government announced in Sokoloff v. National City Bank,
supra, has been approved and applied by the same court, in Fred S.
James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co.,30 and applied by inferior
courts in that state in several cases ;31 and substantially the same rule
As to this point the court said: "Certain we think it is that a decree of
confiscation directed against depositors does not reduce the liabilities of a bank
which has already yielded up its assets in virtue of a decree of confiscation
directed against itself. In such a situation the later decree, if it is to be given
any effect at all, must speak the voice of a power recognized by us as sovereign."
20 (1925) 239 N. Y. 248, 37 A. L. R.-, 146 N. E. 369. The rule was
applied in this case in upholding the liability of a Russian corporation upon cer-
tain reinsurance contracts to the American assignee of an English insurance
company which had reinsured a number of risks with the defendant Russian
corporation, which, while engaged in business in New York, sought to avoid
liability through invoking Soviet decrees nationalizing it, confiscating its assets
and assuming its liabilities. A further circumstance urged in defense in this
case, was the fact that England had, in addition to recognizing Russia, entered
into a trade agreement with that country, which was contended by the defendant
to have confirmed the confiscation of the property of Russian nationals, the
defendant urging the rule that the American assignee (plaintiff) took no better
claim than its assignor had, and that the assignor's claim had been extin-
guished; but this was held not to be the effect of the trade agreement. The
court held, in response to the defendant's contention that it had been nation-
alized, that neither justice nor policy required the court to give effect to the
decree of nationalization of the unrecognized Soviet government, especially
since the defendant had continued to exercise its corporate functions in New
York subsequent to the decree purporting to terminate its legal existence. The
court said that the decree-pronouncing government being at the time of the
judgment unrecognized, the problem before it was not determinable by any
technical rules but by "the largest considerations of public policy and justice,"
and that neither public policy nor justice required it to recognize the legal
extinguishment of the Russian corporation as a means to the nullification of
its just debts. As to the defense that the defendant corporation's assets had
been confiscated, the court said that the decree of confiscation was brutum ful-
men, and continued: "Russia might terminate the liability of Russian corpora-
tions in Russian courts or under Russian law. Its fiat to that effect could not
constrain the courts of other sovereignties, if assets of the debtor were available
for seizure in the jurisdiction of the forum," and this decree was held to be in
no true sense a decree of bankruptcy.
"Decrees of the Soviet government, confiscating property and nationalizing
corporations, have also been denied operation or recognition as lawful, among
other cases,-
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was held applicable to the decrees in England before that country
accorded recognition to the Soviet government.
3 2
But, on the other hand, the courts of England, after recognition
by Great Britain of the Soviet government as the de facto and later
the de jure government of Russia, applied to the decrees of the
present Russian government the principle heretofore stated as appli-
cable to that situation. The different rules applicable where the con-
fiscating government has been recognized and where recognition has
been refused are perspicuously illustrated in the Court of Appeals
decision of the Sagor Case, (supra, note 10) where the judgment of
the court of King's Bench (stated in note 32) was reversed solely
upon the ground that recognition had been accorded Russia subse-
quent to the former judgment rendered in the case. So, in several
cases, the English courts recognized the validity of Russian fiats,
holding that they effectually divested the title of owners of private
property, under the view that such was their intended operation.
33
So, the rule stated above was applied in England, with full effect,
being given the radical decrees of the Soviet regime, until'two impor-
tant and perhaps far-reaching cases came before the House of
Lords, wherein their lordships, in lengthy judgments, made a reEx-
amination of the Russian decrees and unanimously concurred in the
view that the decrees were not intended by the Soviet government
actually to terminate the legal existence of the corporations affected,
-where the defense was made that a Russian corporation had no capacity
to sue, its nationalization having been decreed. Joint Stock Co. of Volgakama
Oil & Chemical Factory v. National City Bank (1924) 210 App. Div. 665, 206
N. Y. Supp. 476; Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925) 211 App. Div
132, 207 N. Y. Supp. 574.
-where a Russian corporation sought to avoid being made a party de-
fendant, over its contention that it was "an arm or part of the Soviet govern-
ment of Russia." Hennenlotter v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. (1924) 124
Misc. 626, 207 N. Y. Supp. 588.
-where it was contended that at a material time large assets of the Singer
Sewing Machine Company in Russia had been lost through confiscations by the
Soviet government. Bourne v. Bourne (1924) 209 App. Div. 419, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 866.
"Aksionairnoye Obschestvo v. Sagor [1921] 1 K. B. 456, holding an Eng-
lish purchaser of plywood confiscated by the Soviet government and imported
into England took no valid title thereby as against the victim of the spoliation,
a Russian corporation which sought, and was allowed, to recover the plywood
after its importation into England. See, note 10, for the final disposition of
this case.
"Aksionairnoye Obschestvo v. Sagor (Court of Appeal) supra, note 10;
White, Child & Beney v. Eagle, S. & B. Dominions Ins. Co. (1922) 127 L. T.
N. S. 571, 38 Times L. R. 616-C. A.; The Jupiter (1924) 40 Times L. R. 673,
judgment affirmed in L. R. [1924] Prob. 236, 40 Times L. R. 815, 93 L. J. Prob.
N. S. 156-C. A. See also the Court of Appeal and King's Bench judgments of
the two House of Lords cases cited infra, note 34.
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but merely stated a present policy of change and contemplated a
future extinguishment of them. 34 These two cases are very interest-
ing in a general survey of the subject, but under the view taken by
their lordships of the cases they are beyond the scope of the note, a
plea, inter alia, that obligations claimed by the plaintiff Russian bank
had been transferred to the Russian government by its decrees not
being necessary to a determination of the case, since the Russian
government had laid no claim to the obligations. But, since the
United States does not recognize Russia, and, as heretofore seen, our
courts need not give effect to its decrees confiscating private property
and dissolving its corporations unless public policy or private justice
requires that they be recognized as proceeding from a quasi-govern-
mental authority, a determination of the intended effect of the decrees
is not important in this country, in cases not so giving effect to
them,3 5 though it would, of course, be necessary in cases where they
were given the effect of law; and in such cases the interpretation
given the decrees and the view taken of their intent by the courts
or lawyers of Russia would doubtless be conclusive upon foreign
courts.
"4Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d'Escomptc de Mul-
house, supra, note 9; Banque Internationale de Commerce v. Goukassow [1925]
A. C. 150.
" See Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co., supra, note 1.
